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Abstract
In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized
governments when regions have comparative advantages in di⁄erent polluting goods. We develop a two-
region, two-good model with inter-regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product
markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions,
the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes,
depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution.
This suggests that federalism can lead to either a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top," without
relying on ine¢ cient lobbying e⁄orts or capital competition.
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11 Introduction
Critical to the setting of domestic environmental policy is whether a centralized government would se-
lect more or less stringent regulations than decentralized governments. Earlier literature has suggested
that decentralization can lead to a ￿race to the bottom,￿ as state, provincial, or regional governments
over-compete for domestic ￿rms and/or capital (e.g., Markusen et al., 1995; Richter and Wellisch, 1996;
Levinson, 1997; Kunce and Shogren, 2002, 2005; McAusland, 2002) or cause ￿rms to over-invest in un-
productive lobbying activities (e.g., Aidt, 1998; Fredriksson et al., 2006), but may alternatively lead to
no di⁄erence in policy outcomes (e.g., Oates and Schwab, 1988; Fredricksson and Gaston, 2000) or to im-
provements in environmental quality through better information about local impacts, the internalization
of transboundary pollution spillovers, or the capture of pollution rents by non-local capital owners (e.g.,
Peltzman and Tideman, 1972; Wellisch, 1995). The results in relation to environmental policy mirror those
of the local public ￿nance or ￿scal federalism literature, where decentralization can serve as a disciplinary
measure against expansionary government taxation or can push governments to e¢ cient public good provi-
sion through the ability of individuals to relocate, but may alternately result in excessive tax competition
to attract ￿rms, employment, and/or capital (Oates and Schwab, 1988). Parallel to this, the main focus of
the environmental policy literature has been on the locational decision of ￿rms, with governments playing
the role as active seekers of employment and capital in environmental policy setting.
Empirical evidence on the impact of environmental policy decentralization has been mixed, although
there is a consensus that decentralization does not necessarily lead to a ￿race to the bottom￿as much
as the theoretical literature suggests. For example, List and Gerking (2000), using data from before
and after the Reagan decentralization of environmental policy enforcement in the early 1980s, found that
real pollution-abatement operating expenditures per $1000 of value-added increased for two of the four
industries considered (chemical/allied products and food/kindred products) but declined in the other two
sectors (primary metals and chemical/applied products). Quite consistent with this, Millimet (2003)
found that environmental decentralization in the U.S. in the 1980s led to a signi￿cant increase in pollution
control expenditure, but per capita nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions did not signi￿cantly decrease
(although there may have been a reduction in the rate of deterioration). More on environmental policy than
environmental outcomes, Sigman (2005) has suggested that free riding by state governments does occur in
water pollution control and, speci￿cally, that states which control their Clean Water Act programs free ride
on downstream states, implying that centralization may be warranted if the cost of free-riding outweighs
the greater ￿ exibility and informational advantages of decentralization.
2A perusal of recent environmental indicators from the World Bank, across di⁄erent pollutants and
among di⁄erent countries, illustrates a similar ambiguity (see Table 1). For example, among the 30 OECD
countries, the 9 countries generally identi￿ed as federations have average carbon dioxide emissions per
capita of 11.4 metric tonnes and nationally protected area (as a share of total land area) of 15.7%,1 while
the countries identi￿ed as having centralized governments have lower average carbon dioxide emissions
per capita (9.2 metric tonnes) but a lower average percentage of nationally protected area (12.8%). In
terms of outcomes, centralized regimes thus have better carbon emissions per capita but protect less of
their land area. Fertilizer consumption (hundred grams per hectare of arable land) is also very much lower
among federations (1341 to 3627), but particulate matter emissions (urban-population-weighted average,
￿g=m3) are virtually identical (25.7 to 25.2). This inconsistency occurs across pollutants for non-OECD
countries as well. It appears, at least on the surface, that decentralization does not even lead to consistent
environmental outcomes within a country: some pollutants may by higher with decentralization while
others are lower.
In this paper, we revisit the theoretical question about the environmental implications of policy decen-
tralization, focusing on the role of productivity gaps and pollution spillovers, in an attempt to provide a
plausible explanation for the observed policy inconsistency. Speci￿cally, we address the following questions:
(1) How does comparative advantage across regions a⁄ect environmental policy and damages? (2) What
are the di⁄erences in the patterns of environmental policy between centralism and federalism when regions
are relatively better at producing di⁄erent polluting goods? (3) How does harmonization of centralized
policy impact the environment? (4) With multiple goods and multiple pollutants (and therefore potentially
multiple taxes), how do environmental damages di⁄er between federalism and centralism?
We use a model comprising a single country with two regions, two (non-numeraire) goods produced by
perfectly competitive industries and a numeraire good. Each region produces both non-numeraire goods but
has a comparative advantage in one of them. The numeraire good is assumed to be non-polluting and freely
traded while the two non-numeraire goods generate di⁄erent pollutants, which may be transboundary, and
are thus subject to environmental taxes. We consider a two-stage game under two government structures:
federalism (or decentralization) and centralism. In the ￿rst stage, either the centralized government sets
environmental taxes to levy on the two polluting goods in each region to maximize national welfare (under
centralism), or each of the two regional governments sets its own taxes to maximize regional welfare (under
1Countries are separated by overall government structure, which may not always be consistent with that of environmental
policy. The countries categorized as federations are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, Switzer-
land, and the United States of America.
3federalism). Under the centralized policy regime, we also consider the case in which the central government
chooses to harmonize taxes within each sector between the two regions. In the second stage of the game,
given the environmental taxes and the structure of government (centralism versus federalism), production,
inter-regional transfers of goods across regions, and consumption take place. In the discussion of the
di⁄erences in taxes and damages between regimes, we describe three distinct e⁄ects: an inter-regional
environmental e⁄ect from cross-border pollution spillovers which tends to push up taxes, an intra-regional
environmental e⁄ect between sectors within a region which has an ambiguous impact on taxes, and an
inter-regional trade e⁄ect from consumption in which tends to lower taxes.
Country Nationally Protected Area CO2 Emissions Per Capita Fertilizer Consumption Particulate Matter
Federal
Austria 28.5 8.5 2332 15
Austalia 9.7 16.2 448 34
Belgium 3.5 9.7 .. 23
Canada 6.9 20.0 692 19
Germany 32.0 9.8 2122 19
Mexico 5.1 4.3 692 40
Spain 9.3 7.7 1286 34
Switzerland 29.6 5.5 2230 25
USA 16.3 20.6 1005 22
Centralized
Czech Republic 18.7 11.5 1525 22
Denmark 25.7 9.8 599 19
Finland 9.7 12.6 1344 18
France 3.0 6.2 2032 14
Greece 3.3 8.7 1652 36
Hungary 9.3 5.7 1234 18
Iceland 4.7 7.6 25249 17
Ireland 1.1 10.4 4619 17
Italy 11.0 7.7 1569 28
Japan 14.3 9.8 3908 31
Luxembourg 17.0 24.9 4907 15
Netherlands 28.0 8.7 6231 35
New Zealand 24.2 7.7 7026 15
Norway 6.5 19.1 1909 20
Poland 9.7 8.0 1281 37
Portugal 5.1 5.6 1709 28
Slovak Republic 22.8 6.7 1125 16
South Korea 2.6 3.4 .. 12
Sweden 10.9 5.9 889 43
United Kingdom 25.0 9.8 2898 16
All Federal Countries (mean) 15.7 11.4 1341 25.7
All Centralized Countries (mean) 12.8 9.2 3627 25.2
Table 1. Environmental performance indicators for the 30 OECD countries, separated into federations and
centralized groups. Source: World Bank (2008).
42 The Model
We consider a country with two regions (A and B) and three goods (a numeraire good and two non-
numeraire goods which we label a and b). Region A has a comparative advantage in the production of
a while region B has a comparative advantage in the production of b. We assume perfect competition
in all markets but allow for the production of each of the two non-numeraire goods to generate pollution
which may have transboundary e⁄ects. The presence of pollution calls for policy intervention and we
consider non-prohibitive environmental taxes (t) that could be imposed on producers either by the central
government or by the local government.
On the demand side, we have quasi-linear preferences represented by
u(c;c0) = v(c) + c0; (1)
where c = [ca;cb] is the consumption vector for the two non-numeraire goods, c0 denotes the consumption
of the numeraire good, and v(c) is quadratic and additively separable in the non-numeraire goods. The
demand for good i (i = a;b) in region j (j = A;B) is then given by
d(p
j
i) = ￿ ￿ p
j
i: (2)
On the supply side, as in Horn et al. (2007), labour (l) is the only factor of production which is employed
in the production of the numeraire good according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology and in the
production of each of the two non-numeraire goods according to a decreasing-returns-to scale technology.








i 2 (0;1] with
￿
j
i = 1 if region j has a comparative advantage in the production of good i and with ￿
j
i < 1 otherwise. If
the marginal product of labour in the production of the numeraire good is one and the supply of labour
is su¢ ciently large that production is positive at all times, we have that the equilibrium wage is equal to
















i denotes the environmental tax producers of good i face in region j.
Assuming that (1) each unit of production generates one unit of pollution, (2) pollution may be trans-
boundary, (3) each production process entails a di⁄erent pollutant, and (4) environmental damages are





















5for j = A;B, where s 2 [0;1] and measures the extent to which pollution generated in the other (￿j)
region travels to region j so that the higher the s, the more transboundary pollution is. As we have two
polluting production processes and thus two pollutants, we can allow for the transboundary nature of the
two pollutants to di⁄er by indexing s with the subscript i (i = a;b).
Our framework of analysis involves two stages: in the ￿rst stage, environmental taxes are set to maxi-
mize welfare de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tax revenues minus environmen-
tal damage; in the second stage, consumption and production decisions take place under the assumption
that markets are perfectly competitive. For the ￿rst stage, we consider two scenarios: in one case, policy is
set centrally so that the objective function includes both the welfare of region A and the welfare of region
B; in the other case, policy is set locally at the regional level so that the objective function includes only
the welfare of the region in which environmental policy is being introduced.
2.1 Consumption and Production Stage
In this subsection, we look at the second stage of the model and solve for equilibrium prices and quantities
for given environmental taxes. Under zero transportation costs, pA
i = pB
i , that is, the price consumers pay
for good i is the same independently of where it is produced, and we can thus omit the superscript j and
express the price of good i simply as pi. Market clearing then requires that national demand equal national
supply or






















for i = a;b. Using that ￿A
a = ￿B













































































respectively, for j = A (so that ￿j = B) when i = a and j = B (so that ￿j = A) when i = b, which is a
labeling strategy we adopt throughout the paper.
6Here we note that the environmental tax in the region with a comparative advantage has a stronger
price e⁄ect than the environmental tax in the other region. That is, the tax imposed on producers of good
a in region A, for example, a⁄ects the price of good a to a greater extent than the tax on producers of
good a in region B. Furthermore, an environmental tax reduces production in the region in which it is
levied but increases it in the other region, although the latter e⁄ect is weaker (in absolute terms) than
the former e⁄ect. Finally, inter-regional exports are decreasing in the environmental tax imposed in the
exporting region but increasing in the environmental tax imposed in the importing region, although again
the dependence is weaker in the latter than in the former. For example, the tax on producers of good a
in region A reduces exports of good a from region A to region B but the tax on producers of good a in
region B increases exports of good a from region A to region B.
Given environmental taxes, the e⁄ects of an increase in ￿, which amounts to a reduction in comparative
advantage, are less straightforward but equally unambiguous. By partial di⁄erentiation of the above










































































￿ < 0: (12)
As ￿ increases, prices and exports decline while production decreases in the region with the comparative
advantage but increases in the other region. Overall, production in sector i increases as the production
increase in the less e¢ cient region is larger than the production decrease in the more e¢ cient region.
2.2 Environmental Policy Stage
In this subsection, we examine the environmental policy setting stage and consider two scenarios: ￿rst,
we have the central government determine the environmental taxes to levy in the two polluting sectors (a
and b) in each of the two regions (A and B); second, we allow for each regional government to choose the
environmental taxes to impose in the two sectors. Although in both cases environmental taxes are welfare-
maximizing, there are two channels through which environmental policy in one region a⁄ects the other
region (trade and pollution movement) giving rise to e⁄ects that are only taken into account by the central
government and thus amount to di⁄erent environmental taxes between federalism and centralism. Trade
7between regions connects consumers and producers in one region with the policy choice in the other region
generating an inter-regional trade e⁄ect that is increasing in the level of trade activity and thus in the
productivity gap between the two regions (the lower the gap is, the lower the level of trade activity and the
weaker the e⁄ect). Given the trade possibilities across the two regions, there also exists substitutability in
production across the two regions through environmental policy. Speci￿cally, environmental taxes reduce
local production but increase production in the other region, and a change in production has both an
environmental e⁄ect through a change in emissions and a tax revenue e⁄ect through a change in tax
revenues. The second channel through which environmental policy in a region a⁄ects the other region
is pollution movement which generates an environmental e⁄ect that is increasing in how transboundary
pollution is (the more transboundary pollution is, the stronger the e⁄ect).
To sum up, there are three e⁄ects explaining any policy divergence between centralism and federalism:
an inter-regional trade e⁄ect, which depends on the extent of trade, an inter-regional environmental e⁄ect
which captures how a tax increase in a region a⁄ects pollution in the other region and depends on substi-
tutability in production between the two regions as well as on the transboundary nature of pollution, and
a tax revenue e⁄ect which depends on substitutability in production between the two regions.
In technical terms, the e⁄ects of t
j
i in region ￿j which a central government takes into account but a
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tax e⁄ect
; (13)
for j = A;B and i = a;b. Provided that some level of trade activity is present, the inter-regional trade
e⁄ect increases the marginal cost of environmental taxes in sectors in which regions have a comparative
advantage and decreases it otherwise. To be clear, a higher tax in region j reduces consumer surplus
(through higher prices and lower consumption) and increases producer surplus (through higher prices and
larger production) in region ￿j. If region ￿j imports from region j, that is, x
￿j
i < d(pi), the e⁄ect
on consumer surplus prevails so that overall surplus decreases and the marginal cost of taxes increases.
However, if region ￿j exports to region j, that is, x
￿j
i > d(pi), the e⁄ect on producer surplus prevails so
that overall surplus increases and the marginal cost of taxes decreases.
Thus, the central government has an incentive to set lower taxes on goods regions are more e¢ cient at
producing but higher taxes on goods regions are less e¢ cient at producing. Given that the tax in the
8region with the comparative advantage has a stronger price e⁄ect than the tax in the other region, the
inter-regional trade e⁄ect within a given sector is larger in the region with the comparative advantage. As
the productivity gap between the two regions decreases (￿
￿j
i increases), the level of exports/imports falls
by (12) and the trade e⁄ect thus weakens.
The inter-regional environmental e⁄ect can also amount to an increase or a decrease in the marginal
cost of environmental taxes as higher taxes in region j result in less pollution spilling over into region ￿j
(spillover e⁄ect) but more pollution being generated through an increase in local production in region ￿j
(own pollution e⁄ect). If pollution is a pure private good, there are no spillovers and the environmental
e⁄ect thus increases the marginal cost of environmental taxes giving the central government an incentive
to decrease taxes. However, if pollution is transboundary, the reduction in spillovers from lower production
in region j may more than o⁄set the increase in pollution from higher production in region ￿j so that
the marginal cost of environmental taxes decreases and the central government opts for higher taxes. The
more transboundary pollution is, the larger the reduction in spillovers from lower production in region
j and the stronger the central government￿ s incentive to increase taxes; although the local production
e⁄ect also increases with the extent to which pollution is transboundary, the change in the spillover e⁄ect
dominates. Furthermore, when the own pollution e⁄ect dominates so that, overall, the environmental
e⁄ect is positive (that is, a higher tax in region j increases environmental damages in region ￿j), as the
productivity gap between the two regions decreases, the environmental e⁄ect gets stronger in sector i but
can increase or decrease in sector ￿i. Correspondingly, when the spillover e⁄ect dominates so that, overall,
the environmental e⁄ect is negative (that is, a higher tax in region j decreases environmental damages
in region ￿j), the environmental e⁄ect as the productivity gap between the two regions decreases gets
stronger in sector ￿i but can increase or decrease in sector i. In essence, a decrease in the productivity gap
in sector i triggers a decrease in production in region j, which weakens the spillover e⁄ect, and an increase
in production in region ￿j, which strengthens the own pollution e⁄ect; a decrease in productivity gap in
sector ￿i triggers a decrease in production in region ￿j, which weakens the own pollution e⁄ect, and an
increase in production in region j, which strengthens the spillover e⁄ect.2
Finally, the tax revenue e⁄ect is always positive in that a higher tax on good i in region j implies more
production in region ￿j and thus higher tax revenues; the smaller the productivity gap between the two
regions is, the more region ￿j produces in sector i and thus the larger the tax e⁄ect.
2See Appendix for a formal derivation of the impact of a change in s or ￿ on the inter-regional environmental e⁄ect.
92.2.1 Central Environmental Policy
Under a centralized system, a country chooses environmental taxes as to maximize its welfare which is
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and environmental damage in region j is given by (4), for j = A;B.
With environmental policy centrally set and thus maximizing the sum of region A￿ s welfare and region








































































Upon inspection of the two taxes, we have
Proposition 1 The larger the pollution spillover e⁄ects of production (si "), the more heavily production is
taxed (t
j
i " and t
￿j
i "), independently of e¢ ciency considerations (i.e., for any ￿
￿j
i ). However, a narrowing
in the productivity gap between the two regions (￿
￿j
i ") always yields a tax decrease in the less e¢ cient
region (t
￿j
i ") but decreases the tax in the more e¢ cient region when pollution is relatively local (t
j
i # for
0 ￿ si < 3 ￿ 2
p
2) and increases it otherwise (t
j
i " for 3 ￿ 2
p
2 < si ￿ 1).
10That an increase in si results in tax increases in both regions is fairly straightforward: the more damaging
production is for a country￿ s environmental quality (through larger spillovers from one region to the other),
the higher the environmental taxes. The e⁄ects of changes in ￿
￿j
i on taxes are however complicated by the
presence of two o⁄setting e⁄ects as production changes have implications not only for local pollution but
also for pollution in the other region. A decrease in the productivity gap in sector i (that is, an increase
in ￿
￿j
i ), triggers a production decrease in the more e¢ cient region and a production increase in the less
e¢ cient region. Less production in the more e¢ cient region means that less pollution spills over into the
less e¢ cient region but, overall, pollution does increase in the latter region even in the extreme case when
pollution is a pure public bad as, by (11), the production increase in this region exceeds the production
decrease in the other region, and the environmental tax thus always increases in the less e¢ cient region.
On the other hand, the pollution level in the more e¢ cient region decreases from lower local production
but increases from higher production in the other region through spillovers; the stronger the spillover
e⁄ects, the more likely the positive e⁄ect on pollution dominates so that the environmental tax in the more
e¢ cient region also increases; alternatively, when spillover e⁄ects are weak, the negative e⁄ect on pollution
dominates so that the environmental tax in the more e¢ cient region decreases.
When we compare the environmental taxes the two regions face on a given good, we obtain
Proposition 2 Under centrally set environmental policy, a good is taxed more heavily in the region which




b ; the tax di⁄erence is how-
ever smaller in the sector with a smaller productivity gap between the two regions and/or larger pollution






b and/or sa > sb.




























If sa > sb and/or ￿B
a > ￿A






























































5 + 2si + s2
i
￿￿


















o2 < 0: (22)
11A regional comparative advantage results in greater production which generates greater pollution (and
higher marginal damages) and is thus taxed at a higher rate. As spillovers increase, the larger production
of a good in the more e¢ cient region implies that more pollution spills over into the less e¢ cient region so
that the tax on the good increases in the latter region by more than in the former region. For example,
when sa increases, more pollution from the production of good a in region A spills over into region B
than from the production of that same good in region B into region A; while environmental taxes on the
production of good a increase in both regions, the tax in region A increases by less than the tax in region B
and the di⁄erence between the two taxes, that is, tA
a ￿tB
a decreases. When the productivity gap decreases
and pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary so that total pollution increases in the more e¢ cient region, the
total pollution increase in the less e¢ cient region exceeds that in the more e¢ cient region. As a result,
the tax increase in the latter region falls short of that in the former region and the di⁄erence between
the two taxes thus decreases. That total pollution increases in the less e¢ cient region by more than in
the more e¢ cient region follows from the fact that, unless pollution is perfectly transboundary (that is,
si = 1), lower production in the latter region has its strongest e⁄ect in terms of pollution reduction locally
and, similarly, higher production in the former region has its stronger e⁄ect in terms of pollution increase
locally.
When we compare the taxes on the two goods within a region, we have
Proposition 3 Under centrally set environmental policy, the tax in the sector in which a region has a
comparative advantage is larger than the tax in the other sector when sa = sb = s and ￿B
a = ￿A
b = ￿ (e.g.,
tA
a > tA
b ). However, if pollution is less transboundary in the more e¢ cient sector than in the other sector
(e.g., sa < sb), the tax di⁄erence (tA
a ￿ tA
b ) is smaller; on the other hand, if the inter-sectoral productivity
gap the region faces is larger than that in other region (e.g., ￿A
b < ￿B
a so that 1 ￿ ￿A
b > 1 ￿ ￿B
a ), the tax
di⁄erence is larger.
When sa = sb = s < 1 and ￿A
b = ￿B







2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2(4 + s2) +
h
(1 + s2)




for j = A when i = a (so that ￿i = b) and j = B when i = b (so that ￿i = a). The positive tax di⁄erential
for 0 ￿ s < 1 stems from the greater pollution region j generates in sector i relative to sector ￿i: the
smaller the productivity gap between the two regions is in each of the two sectors (that is, the larger the
￿) and/or the more transboundary pollution is in each of the two sectors (that is, the larger the s), the
12smaller the tax di⁄erential. In the extreme case in which pollution is a pure public bad in each of the two
sectors (s = 1), region j faces the same tax in each sector independently of its relative e¢ ciency in sector i
(or region ￿j￿ s relative e¢ ciency in sector ￿i). In such a case, given that productivity gaps are the same
in the two sectors, national production of good i is the same as that of good ￿i so that the total amount
of pollution region j faces from sector ￿i is the same as that from sector i even though region j produces
less of that good.



































Using Proposition 1, we then obtain that, if si < s￿i = s, the environmental tax region j faces on good




i = ￿ (that is, region j is more e¢ cient
at producing good i relative to producing good ￿i than region ￿j is at producing good ￿i relative to
producing good i), the environmental tax region j faces on good ￿i decreases relative to the tax it faces on
good i. When the pollution from the production of good i in which region j has a comparative advantage
is relatively local, it is possible for the tax on good ￿i, where it has a comparative advantage, to be higher
than the tax on good i. However, it is also possible for region j to face a higher tax on good i than on




i = ￿, that
is, at values of si and ￿
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3s4 ￿ 3s2 + 18s + 1
￿
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2 + 4(3s4 ￿ s2 + 2s + 7)(s2 ￿ 16s + 8)
￿
2(3s4 ￿ s2 + 2s + 7)
(26)











i = ￿￿￿, with 0 < ￿s;￿￿ ￿ 1, we show combinations of s and




￿i < 0) in Figure 1 for ￿s = 0 and ￿￿ = 1, for ￿s = 0:5
and ￿￿ = 1, and for ￿s = 0 and ￿￿ = 0:5; as ￿s (si) increases and/or ￿￿ (￿
j
￿i) decreases, the curve shifts to
the right so that it becomes less likely for the tax di⁄erential to be negative. When pollution is perfectly
local in sector i (￿s = 0), total pollution region j faces in sector i decreases through lower local production
in response to a decrease in productivity gap in sector i (that is, as ￿
￿j
i increases) and t
j
i thus decreases.
The greater the spillovers in sector ￿i, the higher the t
j
￿i so that t
j
i falls short of t
j
￿i at high values of
13￿
￿j
i and s￿i with a higher value of ￿
￿j
i (and thus lower t
j
i) requiring a lower value of s￿i (and thus lower
t
j
￿i) for the tax di⁄erential to be negative. As si increases (￿s increases), t
j





￿i decreases (￿￿ decreases), that is, the productivity gap in sector i becomes larger than the productivity
gap in sector ￿i, t
j
￿i decreases relative to t
j
i as total pollution region j faces in sector ￿i falls through a
decrease in local production which outweighs the production increase in region ￿j.
Harmonized Taxes As central governments do not tend to resort to di⁄erential tax systems, we further
consider central policy under the constraint that taxes in a given sector be equal between the two regions
(that is, taxes are harmonized). Letting th
i denote the harmonized tax rate in sector i (i = a;b), we derive









































b + 4sb + 2￿A
b
￿: (28)
In comparison to the unharmonized taxes expressed in (18) and (19), the harmonized taxes are lower on








Under harmonized taxes, the less e¢ cient region thus subsidizes the more e¢ cient region; the tax increase
in the former (th
i ￿ t
￿j
i ) is however larger than the tax decrease (t
j
i ￿ th
i ) in the latter as long as pollution
is not a pure public bad (see Appendix A). In fact, for si < 1, the marginal environmental damage of
production in sector i is greater in region j than in region ￿j due to the quadratic nature of the damage
function as region j, being the more e¢ cient producer in sector i, produces more of good i than region
￿j. Hence, a unit tax reduction in sector i increases pollution in region j by more than a unit tax increase





i but closer to t
j
i than to t
￿j





i = 1), the two regions will have the same level of production in sector i and face the same
marginal environmental damage of production independently of the transboundary nature of pollution;
hence, the harmonized tax will be exactly equal to the average of the two unharmonized taxes.
In terms of environmental damages, the unharmonized policy always results in a better environment
when pollution spillovers occur according to the same positive rate across sectors (i.e., 0 < sa = sb < 1) and
14productivity gaps are the same across regions (i.e., 0 < ￿B
a = ￿A
b < 1).3 When moving to harmonization,
the tax changes imply production increases in the comparative advantage sector but decreases in the other
sector; in the absence of di⁄erences in spillover e⁄ects and productivity gaps, the production increase
in the comparative advantage sector dominates so that, overall, environmental damages are larger under
harmonization. However, it is possible for a region to enjoy a better environment under harmonized taxes
if the pollution generated in the comparative advantage sector is more transboundary than the pollution
generated in the other sector and/or if the cross-sectoral productivity gap it faces is smaller than the cross-
sectoral productivity gap the other region faces. An increase in si reduces the gap between pollution under
unharmonized taxes and pollution under harmonized taxes in sector i (through a reduction in the tax gap
and thus in the production gap) but does not alter the pollution gap in sector ￿i. Given that pollution
from sector i is higher in region j but lower in region ￿j (and, correspondingly, pollution from sector ￿i is
higher in region ￿j but lower in region j) under harmonized taxes, the reduction in sector i￿ s pollution gap
that follows the increase in si amounts not only to a lower pollution cost of harmonization in region j but
also to a lower pollution bene￿t of harmonization in region ￿j. While the overall environmental cost of
harmonization increases in region ￿j (that is, the region which does not have a comparative advantage in
sector i), region j may end up being environmentally better o⁄ under harmonized policy as the reduction
in the pollution gap in sector i may be such that the bene￿t from lower pollution in sector ￿i (which is not
a⁄ected by an increase in si) more than o⁄sets the cost from higher pollution in sector i (which decreases
following an increase in si). In Figure 2a, we illustrate the impact of an increase in si on environmental










region ￿j￿ s inter-sectoral productivity gap is smaller than region i￿ s) is less straightforward: from a position
of equality in spillover e⁄ects between the two sectors and productivity gaps between the two regions, an
increase in ￿
￿j
i , ceteris paribus, can increase or decrease the environmental cost of harmonization in region
j (as illustrated in Figure 2b, the increase occurs at low values of ￿
￿j
i or in areas Q and R) and increase or
decrease its environmental bene￿t in region ￿j (in Figure 2b, the increase occurs at combinations of low
values of ￿
￿j
i and high values of si or in area Q). By (11), the magnitude of the impact of a change in ￿
￿j
i
depends on the production level of good i in region ￿j: the more region ￿j produces, the stronger the
e⁄ects of an increase in ￿
￿j
i on good i￿ s production levels in the two regions. As region ￿j￿ s production
level of good i is lower under harmonized policy, an increase in ￿
￿j
i increases the gap in good i￿ s production
3In the extreme case in which pollution is a pure public bad in both sectors (i.e., sa = sb = 1), environmental quality is
the same independently of whether taxes are harmonized.
15between unharmonized and harmonized taxes in each region. However, a change in ￿
￿j
i also a⁄ects the
tax gaps: a lower productivity gap between the two regions (i.e., a higher ￿
￿j
i ) does in fact amount to
less variation between the two regions in the absence of harmonization and thus to a lower tax e⁄ect of
harmonization; a lower tax gap then implies a lower gap between production under unharmonized taxes
and production under harmonized taxes. The lower the productivity advantage that region j enjoys in
sector i relative to region ￿j is (that is, the higher ￿
￿j
i is), the less e⁄ective an increase in ￿
￿j
i is in
increasing region ￿j￿ s production of good i and the closer the taxes the two regions face in sector i under
unharmonized policy are.4 Hence, at high values of ￿
￿j
i , the e⁄ects of an increase in ￿
￿j
i on the tax gaps
tend to prevail and the production gaps thus tend to decrease, that is, harmonization tends to yield a
lower production increase in the e¢ cient region and a lower production decrease in the other region. For
a given si, pollution is then more likely to decrease (increase) in region j and increase (decrease) in region
￿j as ￿
￿j
i increases at low (high) values of ￿
￿j
i . As si increases, the lower pollution increase region ￿j
experiences under harmonization has a greater impact on region j￿ s total pollution and lower values of ￿
￿j
i
are then required for region j￿ s pollution to increase in response to an increase in ￿
￿j
i . At the same time,
the lower pollution decrease region j experiences under harmonization has a greater impact on region ￿j￿ s
total pollution and higher values of ￿
￿j
i are required for region ￿j￿ s pollution to decrease in response to an
increase in ￿
￿j
i . In light of the above, it is possible for the region with a comparative advantage in sector i
to enjoy a better environment under harmonized policy at high values of ￿
￿j
i (area S in Figure 2b) and for
the region which is less e¢ cient in sector i to face less pollution under harmonized taxes at combinations
of low values of ￿
￿j
i and high values of si (area Q in Figure 2b). In Figure 2c, we illustrate the impact of
an increase in ￿
￿j
i on environmental damages given ￿, si;s￿i, and ￿
j
￿i.
2.2.2 Regional Environmental Policy
Under a decentralized system, each of the two regions (e.g., region j) chooses the environmental taxes to








































is the vector of environmental taxes in region j and consumer surplus, producer surplus,
tax revenue, and environmental damage in region j are expressed in (15) through (17) and (4), respectively.






























































































































i ￿ 54 < 0: (32)
When we consider the sector in which a region does not have a comparative advantage (e.g., sector a for
region B and sector b for region A) and compare the relevant centralized taxes given in (18) and (19) with
the corresponding decentralized taxes given in (30) and (31), we obtain
Proposition 4 The environmental tax on the good which a region is less e¢ cient at producing is always
higher under a centralized system than under a decentralized system, that is, tA
b > e tA
b and tB
a > e tB
a .

























































o > 0; (33)
where ￿1, ￿2, and ￿3 are positive parameters.5 For the sector in which a region does not have a comparative
advantage and must thus import from the other region, the inter-regional trade e⁄ect and the tax revenue
e⁄ect work in the same direction to increase the marginal bene￿t of environmental taxes. The combined
positive e⁄ect on tax setting stems from an increase in the value of trade and the additional tax revenues
region j enjoys through higher production. At low values of si, the inter-regional environmental trade e⁄ect
works in the opposite direction to increase the marginal cost of environmental taxes as higher production
in region j yields higher pollution. However, even in the extreme case when si = 0 (that is, pollution is
perfectly local in sector i), the combined positive e⁄ect from trade and tax revenue more than o⁄sets the
negative environmental e⁄ect so that, overall, the central government always opts for a higher tax than
the regional government in the comparative advantage sector.
For the sector in which a region does have a comparative advantage, we instead obtain































i + 104si > 0.
17Proposition 5 The environmental tax on the good which a region is more e¢ cient at producing is higher
under a centralized system when the production of the good generates substantial pollution spillovers. For
su¢ cently low values of si, there exists however a productivity gap between the two regions above which the
tax is higher under a decentralized system, with a smaller si requiring a smaller productivity gap for the
tax to be higher under a decentralized system.






























































i is always positive for si >
p
0:5 and is positive
otherwise, provided that ￿
￿j
i is not too small; for si <
p





i ￿ e t
j
i to be positive. When pollution arising from the production of good i is perfectly local (i.e.,
si = 0), the environmental tax on good i in region j is larger under the decentralized regime than under
the centralized regime for any productivity gap between the two regions (that is, for any value of ￿
￿j
i );
when si = 0, (34) in fact reduces to
t
j





























In the determination of the environmental tax on the good in which a region has a comparative advantage,
the inter-regional environmental e⁄ect and tax revenue e⁄ect work in the same manner as in the setting of
the tax on the ine¢ ciently produced good above considered, increasing the tax rate as spillovers increase.
However, the inter-regional trade e⁄ect not only works in the opposite direction as lower taxes generate
bene￿ts to consumers in two regions rather than one, thus decreasing the tax rate, but is also larger
in magnitude because of the larger price e⁄ect of the tax in the more e¢ cient sector. When pollution is
perfectly local, the inter-regional environmental e⁄ect consists solely of the own pollution e⁄ect and thus re-
enforces the inter-regional trade e⁄ect in lowering the central tax relative to the regional tax. As pollution
becomes less local, the spillover e⁄ect increases, counteracting the own pollution e⁄ect and eventually
changing the direction of the inter-regional environmental e⁄ect. For a given productivity gap between
the two regions, there exists a si above which the positive inter-regional environmental e⁄ect coupled



























i + 90si > 0.
18with the tax revenue e⁄ect more than o⁄sets the negative inter-regional trade e⁄ect and the central tax
is greater than the regional tax. The smaller the productivity gap between the two regions is, the weaker
the inter-regional trade e⁄ect because of the lower trade volume and thus the smaller the spillover e⁄ect
that is necessary for the central tax to be greater than the regional tax. We show the critical value of si
as a function of ￿
￿j
i such that t
j
i ￿ e t
j
i = 0, thus solving (34), in Figure 3; in the dark grey area, below the
critical si curve, the centrally set tax on the good in which a region has a comparative advantage is smaller
than the corresponding tax under a decentralized system.
As the case under a centralized regime, a good is taxed more heavily under a decentralized system in
the region which enjoys a comparative advantage in its production, that is,
e t
j























i < e t
j



















































o < 0; (37)
where ￿1, ￿2, and ￿3 are positive parameters.7 We can then conclude that, when central taxes are greater
than local taxes in both sectors, the tax premium under a centralized system is larger in the region that








i. The presence of the inter-regional trade
e⁄ect in the setting of central taxes is at the core of this result: a tax increase in the sector in which a
region enjoys an exporting position yields a price increase that generates a net cost to the importing region
as the gain in producer surplus falls short of the loss in consumer surplus. A tax increase in the sector in
which a region imports yields a price increase that generates a net bene￿t to the exporting region as the
gain in producer surplus more than o⁄sets the loss in consumer surplus. Hence, the inter-regional trade
e⁄ect serves to curb the central government￿ s incentive to impose higher taxes for goods regions export
but to re-enforce it for goods regions import.
When we compare the taxes within a given region, we ￿nd that, as in the central policy case, the
good in which the region has a comparative advantage may be taxed at a higher or lower rate depending
on di⁄erences in the transboundary nature of pollution between the two production processes as well as
di⁄erences in comparative advantage between the two regions. The tax di⁄erential, which is positive and
equal to the within sector tax di⁄erential given in (36) in the absence of di⁄erences in spillover e⁄ects



























i + 30si + 17 > 0.
19and productivity gaps, is however monotonic in each of the four parameters, namely, sa, sb, ￿B















































Therefore, the stronger the pollution spillovers of good i are relative to the pollution spillovers of good ￿i,
the higher the tax region j faces on good i, the good which it produces more e¢ ciently and thus it exports











where ￿s = si
s￿i. Although a reduction in the comparative advantage region j enjoys in the production of
good i has the same qualitative e⁄ect on the tax di⁄erential as a reduction in the comparative advantage


















; in other words, a decrease in the productivity advantage region j has in the production of
good i (i.e., increase in ￿
￿j
i ) reduces the tax region j pays on good i relative to the tax it pays on good ￿i
by a smaller amount than an equal decrease in the productivity advantage region ￿j has in the production
of good ￿i (i.e., increase in ￿
j
￿i).8 An increase in productivity increases production in the importing region
by more than it decreases production in the exporting region. This di⁄erential e⁄ect on production has
implications for a region￿ s incentive to increase or decrease its environmental tax in the a⁄ected sector.
Trade increases the cost of taxation in the importing region but decreases it (or, equivalently, increases
the bene￿t of taxation) in the exporting region; the larger the volume of trade volume is, the higher the
cost or bene￿t of taxation is depending on the direction of trade. A larger increase in production in the
importing region in response to an increase in productivity (which results in less dependence on imports
in spite of the increase in local consumption following a price reduction) amounts to a larger reduction in
the cost of taxation, or a stronger weakening of the incentive to lower the tax on the imported good, than

























































































20the reduction in the bene￿t of taxation in the exporting region from a decrease in production and thus
exports.9 Hence, a decrease in productivity gap has a stronger tax e⁄ect in the importing region.10
In setting taxes, a region takes into account the e⁄ects that these instruments have on total surplus, tax
revenues, and environmental damages. Independently of whether the region has a comparative advantage
in a given sector, it faces a trade-o⁄ between generating more tax revenues through greater production
which requires lower taxes and keeping the environment cleaner through lower production and thus higher
taxes. The tax e⁄ect on total surplus is however linked to the direction and extent of trade and therefore
to the presence and extent of a comparative advantage; a tax increase does in fact generate net bene￿ts
through higher prices of exports (in the comparative advantage sector) but net costs through higher prices
of imports (in the other sector). The additional bene￿ts of taxes on goods regions are more e¢ cient at
producing translate into higher taxes; conversely, the additional costs of taxes on goods regions are less
e¢ cient at producing translate into lower taxes. Clearly, the larger the extent of trade is as a result of
a greater productivity gap between the two regions, the greater the revenue from exports or the cost of
imports is; hence, as the volume of trade increases, the exporting region faces a stronger incentive to
increase its tax while the importing region faces a stronger incentive to decrease its tax. Correspondingly,
the smaller the productivity gap is, the smaller the revenue from exports or the cost of imports is and the
weaker the exporting region￿ s incentive to increase its tax or the importing region￿ s incentive to decrease its
tax. This convergence of incentives amounts to a decrease in the tax gap between exporting and importing
regions within a given sector and between exporting and importing sectors within a given region.
Aside from di⁄erences in the direction of incentives stemming from trade considerations, there exist
di⁄erences in the strength of incentives arising from environmental considerations. As long as pollution
generated in a given sector is not perfectly transboundary, its level and the associated bene￿t of a tax
increase are higher in the region that produces more, that is, the region with a comparative advantage.
The more transboundary pollution is in a given sector, the smaller the pollution gap between the two
regions and, correspondingly, the smaller the tax gap. Put di⁄erently, although each region faces a larger
pollution level and thus a greater incentive to increase its tax as pollution becomes more transboundary,
the importing region (that is, the region producing less), faces a larger increase in pollution and thus a
9A decrease in productivity gap between the two regions reduces the price level and thus increases local consumption in
both regions. Exports thus fall by more than local production.
10The tax implications of the di⁄erential e⁄ect on production of a decrease in productivity gap may also be linked to
environmental considerations. In fact, unless pollution in the exporting sector is substantially more transboundary than
pollution in the importing sector, overall pollution increases in the latter by more than in the former, thus providing a region
with additional incentives to increase its tax on the imported good. A decrease in productivity gap in the sector in which
a region has a comparative advantage does in fact reduce pollution in that sector, provided that its spillover e⁄ects are not
signi￿cant.
21greater incentive to increase its tax.






















































we obtain the lower bound value of the di⁄erence of the two tax di⁄erentials when ￿￿ = ￿s = 0 and the




































must be negative for any combination of feasible ￿s and ￿￿ values. That the gap between the two taxes
within a region is narrower under a centralized regime follows directly from the presence of the inter-
regional trade e⁄ect which reduces the bene￿t of taxes for exported good but increases it for imported
goods.
2.3 Assessing the Environment: Central versus Regional Policy
In assessing the environmental impact of central policy versus local policy, we compare the environmental
damages in region j under the two tax regimes. We initially consider a situation in which productivity
gaps are the same between the two regions and spillover e⁄ects are the same between the two goods. Our
initial case involves si = s and ￿
￿j
i = ￿ so that we need only assess environmental di⁄erences for one of
the two regions (e.g., region j).
Using the damage function given in (4), the central taxes in (18) and (19), and the local taxes in (30)
and (31), we can express the di⁄erence between the environmental damage under a centralized system and
the environmental damage under a decentralized system as










































































and s = [sa;sb] are the vectors of






















. Upon inspection of the above di⁄erence,
we have
22Proposition 6 When the two goods have identical spillover e⁄ects (i.e., sa = sb = s) and the two regions




a = 1 ￿ ￿), environmental
damages from production can be larger under a centralized regime. In particular, for a given productivity
gap (￿), damages tend to be lower under a decentralized regime when pollution from each of the two goods
is relatively local (at low values of s). The smaller the productivity gap (the larger the ￿), the more local
pollution has to be (the smaller the s) for damages to be lower under local taxes.
Letting b s satisfy ￿j (￿;s) = 0, we have that
lim
￿!0
b s(￿) = 0:5
p
2 ￿ 0:71 and lim
￿!1











@￿ < 0 and @￿j
@s < 0.11 We also note that, for s = 0,
￿j (￿;s) =
4￿2 ￿






26￿2 + 85￿ + 54
￿2 > 0 (46)
and, for s = 1,
￿j (￿;s) = ￿
2￿2 ￿
19￿2 + 42￿ + 19
￿￿
5￿2 + 10￿ + 1
￿
(7￿ + 9)
2 (3￿ + 5)
2 < 0: (47)
Therefore, when pollution is perfectly local, centrally set policy always yields greater damages; when
pollution is perfectly transboundary, locally set policy always yields greater damages. When the two
regions face the same productivity gap between sectors and the two production processes involve the
same spillover rates, we then conclude that damages are always smaller under a central policy regime for
s > 0:5
p
2; however, for s < 0:5
p
2, whether damages are greater or smaller under one regime or the
other depends on ￿. Speci￿cally, as
db s(￿)
d￿ < 0 and ￿j (￿;s) > 0 for s < b s, the larger ￿ is, the lower the
upper bound of the range of s values over which damages under central taxes exceed damages under local
taxes. Put di⁄erently, the larger the productivity gap between the two sectors, the more likely it is for
a decentralized system to be preferable to a centralized system from an environmental point of view. In
terms of Figure 4, damages are smaller with locally set taxes below (or to the left of) the b s curve.
Before we consider the implications of relaxing the assumption that ￿s = ￿￿ = 1, we look at the
di⁄erence in environmental damages relative to the di⁄erence in taxes between the two regions. To be
clear, we are interested in whether there exists consistency between the two di⁄erences whereby higher
11That
@￿j
@s < 0 implies that ￿
j (￿;s) > 0 for s < b s and ￿
j (￿;s) < 0 for s > b s. See appendix for more detail.
23environmental taxes under a particular policy regime correspond to lower environmental damages under
the same regime or vice versa. To this end, we use (43) and (34), thus ignoring (33) which is always
positive, and obtain
Proposition 7 For sa = sb = s and ￿A
b = ￿B
a = ￿, when the tax a region faces on the good it is more
e¢ cient at producing is larger under a central system than under a local system (i.e., t
j
i > e t
j
i), environmental
damages are always smaller with central taxes. However, when the opposite holds true (i.e., t
j
i < e t
j
i), there
exist s values for each productivity gap ￿ such that environmental damages are greater under central policy.
Letting b b s satisfy T
j




i = 0, we have that lim
￿!0
b b s(￿) = lim
￿!0
b s(￿) ￿ 0:71 and lim
￿!1
























@s > 0.12 We can then show that b b s > b s so that, for a given ￿ and for s < b b s, central policy
always involves lower environmental taxes but yields lower damages for values of s 2
￿
b s;b b s
￿
and greater
damages for values of s 2 (0;b s). We illustrate the two possibilities in Figure 4 where D1 denotes the area
with lower taxes and damages under central policy and D2 the area with lower taxes but greater damages
under central policy.
As the environmental damage function is separable in pollutants emitted in di⁄erent sectors, the level
of pollution each sector contributes to is only dependent on the environmental policy in place in that
sector both at home (own e⁄ect) as well as in the other region (cross e⁄ect). The own and cross e⁄ects
of environmental policy work in opposite directions but the former is always larger in magnitude than the
latter. Furthermore, if pollution is transboundary, the net e⁄ect of a switch from local governments to a
central government (and thus a change in environmental policy) on the pollution level a region faces in
a given sector is ultimately detemined by the size of the own and cross e⁄ects of its environmetal policy
in that sector relative to the own and cross e⁄ects of the other region￿ s environmental policy in the same
sector.13 Given that the switch always triggers an increase in the environmental tax in the sector in which
a region is less productive but either a decrease in the environmental tax in the more e¢ cient sector or
an increase that is however smaller than both the tax increase experienced by the same region in the less














@s > 0 implies that T
j
i (￿;s) > 0 for s > b b s and T
j
i (￿;s) < 0 for s < b b s. See appendix for more detail.
13Own and cross e⁄ects of environmental policy are given in Table 2a. Net e⁄ects of changes in environmental policy
resulting from replacing a dentralized regime with a centralized regime are given in Table 2b.
24Tables 2a and 2b and depicted in Figures 5a and 5b, an increase in t
j
￿i decreases the pollution level region
j faces in sector ￿i when t
￿j
￿i increases (that is, region ￿j, which has a comparative advantage in sector
￿i, experiences a tax increase in the same sector) for any degree of transboundary pollution (any s) and
productivity gap (any ￿), as well as when t
￿j
￿i decreases provided that the productivity gap between the
two regions is not excessively large. An increase in t
j
i is however less likely to decrease the pollution level
region j faces in sector i unless pollution spillovers are so signi￿cant that the e⁄ect from the pollution
decrease in the other region dominates. At lower s values, this dominance disappears and larger ￿ values
are then necessary to reduce the inter-regional trade e⁄ect in order to increase the relevance of the increase
in t
j
i which reduces region j￿ s production of good i and to decrease the relevance of the increase in t
￿j
i
which increases region j￿ s production of pollution of good i.
To clarify, let us consider the e⁄ects of tax changes from a shift to centralism in region A which has
a comparative advantage in sector a and thus experiences a tax increase in sector b (tA
b ") and either a
tax decrease or a smaller tax increase in sector a (tA
a # or tA
a " but dtA
a < dtA
b ). The increase in the tax
in sector b triggers a decrease in the production of good b in region A (own e⁄ect) and an increase in the
production of good b in region B (cross e⁄ect). Given that, in absolute terms, the own e⁄ect dominates
the cross e⁄ect and that the marginal contribution to pollution of region B￿ s production does not exceed
the marginal contribution to pollution of region A￿ s production (that is, sb ￿ 1), the level of pollution
region A faces in sector b decreases, other things being equal in region B. However, the shift to a central
government also a⁄ects region B￿ s taxes; as region B has a comparative advantage in sector b, the tax it
faces on good b either decreases or increases by a smaller amount than region A￿ s tax (tB




b ). If region B￿ s tax increases, production of good b falls in region B (own e⁄ect) but increases in
region A (cross e⁄ect); with the own e⁄ect of the increase in tA
b dominating the cross e⁄ect of the increase
in tB
b , the cross e⁄ect of the former complementing the own e⁄ect of the latter, and dtA
b > dtA
a , region A￿ s
total pollution in sector b always decreases.
On the other hand, if region B￿ s tax decreases, production increases in region B but decreases in region
A; the own e⁄ect of the decrease in tB
b thus re-enforces the cross e⁄ect of the increase in tA
b , provided that
sb > 0, increasing region A￿ s pollution, while the cross e⁄ect re-enforces the own e⁄ect of the increase in
tA
b decreasing region A￿ s pollution. As the own e⁄ect is always larger in the sector in which a region has
a comparative advantage, it is possible, as long as sb > 0, for the overall positive e⁄ect on pollution (from
own e⁄ect of decrease in tB
b and cross e⁄ect of increase in tA
b ) to more than o⁄set the overall negative e⁄ect
(from cross e⁄ect of decrease in tB
b and own e⁄ect of increase in tA
b ). It turns out that a su¢ cient, although
25not necessary, condition for the net e⁄ect on pollution to be negative is that some minimum productivity
level be achieved in sector b by region A. In fact, the more productive region A is in sector b (or the less
ine¢ cient region A is relative to region B), the weaker the dominance of the own e⁄ect of the decrease in
tB
b relative to the own e⁄ect of the increase in tA
b . For very low values of ￿A
b , it is still possible for the net
e⁄ect on pollution to be negative and we illustrate the possibility in Figure 5a as the two areas labelled
P1, with the area labelled P2 then giving cases in which the net e⁄ect on pollution is positive.
For the net impact of shifting to centralism on the pollution level in the sector in which a region has
a comparative advantage, we can sum up the above e⁄ects from the perspective of region B. So if tB
b
increases, region A￿ s contribution to region B￿ s pollution in sector b decreases as the own e⁄ect of the
increase in tA
b (decrease in xA
b ) is stronger than the cross e⁄ect of the increase in tB
b (increase in xA
b ), at the
margin, and tA
b increases by more than tB
b . The relevance of this overall negative e⁄ect on pollution does
depend on the degree of transboundary pollution: the more transboundary pollution is (the larger sb), the
more important the e⁄ect is. The direction of the change in region B￿ s contribution to its own pollution
in sector b is however ambiguous as the own e⁄ect of the increase in tB
b (decrease in xB
b ) is stronger than
the cross e⁄ect of the increase in tA
b (increase in xB
b ), at the margin, but tB
b increases by less than tA
b . In
spite of the ambiguity, we have that region B￿ s pollution is always lower under a centralized policy system
when region A￿ s contribution to region B￿ s pollution is substantial (that is, sb > 1=3); for sb < 1=3, it is
still quite possible for region B￿ s pollution to be lower under central taxes, as we illustrate in Figure 5b
with the area labelled P3, but not for every feasible value of ￿A
b . Speci￿cally, for sb < 1=3, the impact of a
reduction in region A￿ s contribution to region B￿ s pollution is less signi￿cant and a lower productivity gap
between the two regions is then necessary for region B￿ s contribution to its own pollution to decrease; at
higher values of ￿A
b , the own e⁄ect of the increase in tB
b is less dominant relative to the cross e⁄ect of the
increase in tA
b but the size of the increase in tA
b also falls relative to the size of the increase in tB
b .
On the other hand, a decrease in tB
b re-enforces the positive e⁄ect that the increase in tA
b has on region
B￿ s production of good b and, overall, causes region B￿ s pollution in sector b to always increase when
region A￿ s contribution is not substantial (or sb < 1=3); for sb > 1=3, it is still quite possible for region B￿ s
pollution to be higher under central taxes, as we illustrate in Figure 5b with the area labelled P2, but not
for every feasible value of ￿A
b . Speci￿cally, for sb > 1=3, the impact of a reduction in region A￿ s contribution
to region B￿ s pollution is more signi￿cant and a higher productivity gap between the two regions is then
necessary for region B￿ s contribution to its own pollution not only to increase but to increase by enough as
to o⁄set the negative e⁄ect of region A￿ s contribution; as previously, at lower values of ￿A
b , the own e⁄ect
26of the increase in tB
b is more dominant relative to the cross e⁄ect of the increase in tA
b , although the size of
the increase in tA
b is larger relative to the size of the increase in tB
b .
2.3.1 Relaxing the Assumptions that sa = sb = s and ￿A
b = ￿B
a = ￿




i as we above de￿ne, we relax the assumptions that sa = sb = s
and ￿A
b = ￿B
a = ￿ by considering the case in which ￿s < 1 and ￿￿ < 1. Hence, we examine the di⁄erence













































































































In spite of the above ambiguities in how a change in ￿s a⁄ects the di⁄erence in region ￿j￿ s environmental
damages between central and local policies, or  ￿j￿e  
￿j
, and a change in ￿￿ a⁄ects the di⁄erence in region
j￿ s environmental damages between the two policies, or  j ￿ e  
j




 ￿j￿e  
￿j￿
@￿s < 0 for ￿
￿j
i = ￿ > 0:09 or si = ￿ss￿i = ￿ss > 0:49 and
@
￿
 j￿e  
j￿





i = ￿￿￿ 6 0:50.14
According to the above marginal e⁄ects, we have
Proposition 8 The less polluting good i is relative to good ￿i and/or the larger region j￿ s comparative
advantage relative to region ￿j￿ s comparative advantage, the more likely it is for environmental damages
to be higher under central policy in each of the two regions.
14We summarize the e⁄ects of changes in ￿s and ￿￿ on taxes and environmental damages under central policy versus federal
policy in Table 3.
27A decrease in ￿s yields an increase in
￿
 j ￿ e  
j￿
and, provided that ￿ is not su¢ ciently low, an increase in
￿
 ￿j ￿ e  
￿j￿
. Similarly, a decrease in ￿￿ leads to an increase in
￿
 ￿j ￿ e  
￿j￿
and, provided that s is not
su¢ ciently low, an increase in
￿
 j ￿ e  
j￿
. As we illustrate in Figures 7a to 7d, such changes correspond
graphically to a rightward shifting of the zero-isovalue curves so that, for a given s, a larger ￿ is necessary
for the di⁄erence in environmental damages to be zero. The set of s and ￿ combinations above the zero
isovalue curves which yield negative values for the di⁄erences in environmental damages thus gets smaller
implying that central policy is less likely to result in lower environmental damages. While the e⁄ect of
a decrease in ￿s is qualitatively the same as the e⁄ect of a decrease in ￿￿, the former is stronger at high
s and low ￿ values, especially on
￿
 j ￿ e  
j￿
, and the latter at low s and high ￿ values, especially on
￿
 ￿j ￿ e  
￿j￿
.
In terms of the e⁄ects of changes in ￿s and ￿￿ on taxes, we are particularly interested in the tax on the
good a region is more e¢ cient at producing (that is, good i in region j and good ￿i in region ￿j) under
central policy versus federal policy. As the central tax on the good a region is less e¢ cient at producing is
always larger then the corresponding federal tax, the question of whether changes in ￿s and/or ￿￿ impact
the likelihood of central policy yielding higher or lower taxes is not applicable. Hence, when we consider
the tax di⁄erence for the sector in which a region has a comparative advantage, we have
Proposition 9 The less polluting good i is relative to good ￿i, the more likely it is for the tax on good
i in region j, which has a comparative advantage in its production, to be lower under central policy. The
larger region j￿ s comparative advantage relative to region ￿j￿ s comparative advantage, the more likely it is
for the tax on the good ￿i in region ￿j, which has a comparative advantage in its production, to be lower
under central policy.
















; a decrease in ￿￿ leads instead
















. As we illustrate in Figures 8a and 8b, such changes
correspond graphically to a rightward shifting of the zero-isovalue curves so that, for a given s, a larger ￿
is necessary for the di⁄erence in taxes to be zero. The set of s and ￿ combinations below the zero isovalue
curves which yield negative values for the di⁄erences in taxes thus gets larger implying that central policy

















, the former is stronger at high s and low ￿ values
and the latter at low s and high ￿ values.
When si < s￿i = s (￿s < 1), the spillover e⁄ect is weaker in sector i and the corresponding gap
between the central tax and the local tax is thus smaller in region ￿j. What happens to the gap in region
28j depends on whether the the di⁄erence between the two taxes is positive or negative when ￿s = 1: if it is
positive, the weakening in spillover e⁄ect amounts to a lower gap; if it is negative, it amounts to a larger
gap (larger negative di⁄erence between the central tax and the local tax). As the spillover e⁄ect in a region
is a positive function of the production level in the other region and as region j produces more of good i
than region ￿j, a less transboundary pollution in sector i involves a larger drop in the tax gap in region












@￿s > 0 (the comparison is meaningful when the central tax
on good i is higher than the local tax in the less productive region, that is, region ￿j).
Thus, a region that has a comparative advantage in the sector with greater spillovers (e.g., region ￿j
when s￿i > si) faces a lower tax gap between the two tax regimes in the less productive sector (e.g., sector
i) and, provided that the central tax is larger than the local tax, a larger gap in the more productive sector.
If, however, the central tax in the comparative advantage sector is lower than the local tax as a result of
a strong inter-regional trade e⁄ect (or a large volume of trade with the other region), the region faces a
lower tax gap in its e¢ cient (and more polluting) sector. The lower central taxes in the sector with weaker
spillovers amount to larger environmental damages under centralization so that the damage gap between
the two tax systems is larger in both regions when the di⁄erence between central and local damages is
positive and smaller when the di⁄erence is negative. If the central tax is instead lower than the local tax in
the comparative advantage sector so that production is greater under centralization, lower spillovers in this
sector have greater bene￿ts in terms of a reduction in environmental damages in the region receiving the
spillovers under centralization. It is then possible for these additional bene￿ts to outweigh the additional
costs of lower spillovers under a central tax regime (that is, a greater production increase through a greater
tax reduction) when the inter-regional trade e⁄ect is strong and/or the spillover e⁄ect is very weak. A
region that is less e¢ cient in the sector with fewer spillovers may thus face a lower gap in environmental
damages when it exports heavily from, and/or receives less pollution from, the other region (e.g., when








i = ￿ (￿￿ < 1), we have a stronger inter-regional trade e⁄ect in sector ￿i which
decreases the central tax in region ￿j but increases it in region j, a weaker tax revenue e⁄ect which
decreases the central tax in both regions, and a change in the inter-regional environmental e⁄ect which
increases the central tax in region ￿j if the own pollution e⁄ect dominates or decreases the central tax in
region j if the spillover e⁄ect dominates but has otherwise ambiguous e⁄ects. Overall, however, the gap
between the central tax and the local tax on good ￿i is always smaller in region j and smaller in region
29￿j if the di⁄erence between the central and local taxes is positive when ￿￿ = 1 but larger if the di⁄erence
is negative when ￿￿ = 1. Because of the di⁄erent implications of a strengthening of the inter-regional
trade e⁄ect for the tax gap depending on whether the sector is the more or less e¢ cient one, a lower












@￿￿ > 0 (the comparison is meaningful when the central tax on good ￿i is higher than
the local tax in the more productive region, that is, region ￿j).
A region with a comparative advantage in the sector characterized by a larger productivity gap (e.g.,
region ￿j when 1 ￿ ￿
j
￿i > 1 ￿ ￿
￿j
i ) then faces a greater tax gap between the two tax regimes in the
less productive sector (e.g., sector i) and, provided that the central tax is larger than the local tax, a
lower gap in the more productive sector (e.g., sector ￿i). If, however, the central tax in the comparative
advantage sector is lower than the local tax, the region faces a larger tax gap in its e¢ cient sector. In
terms of environmental damages, the productivity gap increase in one of the two sectors raises production
in the more e¢ cient region and decreases it in the less e¢ cient region under either of the two tax systems.
However, although overall damages may decrease under both centralization and decentralization if pollution
is su¢ ciently transboundary, the presence of the inter-regional trade e⁄ect results in a larger production
increase in the more e¢ cient region under central taxes so that the damage gap between the two tax




￿i decreases). In the less
e¢ cient region, environmental damages decrease under both tax systems as the production decrease (and
thus pollution decrease) the region experiences due to the increase in productivity gap more than outweighs
the production increase (and thus increase in pollution that spills over) in the more productive region.
When the productivity gap is larger, the damage decrease under centralization can be smaller or larger
than the damage decrease under decentralization and, correspondingly, the damage gap can be larger or
smaller. To understand the reason, we can think of the e⁄ect of a productivity gap change on production in
the less e¢ cient region as comprising a direct (positive) e⁄ect at given tax rates as captured in (11) which
depends on the level of production and indirect (negative) e⁄ects through tax changes. Due to the inter-
regional trade e⁄ect, a larger productivity gap triggers smaller decreases in central taxes which amount to
weaker indirect e⁄ects and thus contribute to increasing the overall (positive) e⁄ect of a productivity gap
change on production. However, also due to the inter-regional trade e⁄ect, the production level is smaller
under central taxes and the resulting smaller direct e⁄ect thus contributes to decreasing the overall e⁄ect
of a productivity gap change. For a given degree of transboundary pollution, the smaller the productivity
gap is, the smaller the production gap between the two tax regimes is: the magnitude of the overall e⁄ect
30of a productivity gap change on production is then more likely to be determined by di⁄erences in indirect
e⁄ects and production in the less productive region is thus more likely to decrease by more under central
taxes in response to a productivity gap increase. For a given productivity gap, the less transboundary
pollution is, the more relevant the inter-regional trade e⁄ect is: di⁄erences in indirect e⁄ects between the
two tax regimes are then more important and production in the less productive region is thus more likely
to decrease by more under central taxes in response to a productivity gap increase. Therefore, under
centralization, the damage gap increases as the productivity gap increases when production in the less
productive region falls by less but may decrease when it falls by more.15
If we take into account both the e⁄ects on environmental daamges and the e⁄ects on taxes,16 we ￿nd
that, under central policy, lower taxes are less likely to be accompanied by smaller environmental damages
whenever changes in ￿s or ￿￿ have no impact on taxes. However, when central taxes decrease relative to
federal taxes in response to a decrease in ￿s or in ￿￿, smaller taxes are more likely to be accompanied by
smaller environmental damages under central policy. In fact, the likelihood that region j faces both a lower
tax on good i and lower environmental damages under central policy actually increases despite that region
j is less likely to face a higher tax on good i under centralized policy, but is also less likely to enjoy a better
environment when good i has smaller pollution spillovers than good ￿i, as we illustrate in Figures 9a and
9b. Similarly, under central policy, region ￿j is less likely to face a higher tax on good ￿i (i.e., the good
in which it has a comparative advantage) but is also less likely to experience lower environmental damages
when its comparative advantage in sector ￿i is not as strong as region j￿ s comparative advantage in sector
i; nevertheless, the e⁄ect on the tax dominates the e⁄ect on the environment so that, overall, region ￿j is
more likely to face both a lower tax on good ￿i and lower environmental damages under central policy.17
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the role of federalism versus centralism in the determination of environmental
taxes. Comparing federalism and centralism, we are interested in the impact on both the individual taxes
set on pollutants by the regional or central government(s) and the e⁄ect on total pollution damages in the
country.
15That production in the less productive region fall by more under central taxes is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition
for the damage gap to decrease in response to an increase in productivity gap.
16We are interested here in cases in which central taxes can be lower or higher than federal taxes depending on the values
of s and ￿. Hence, we ignore instances in which central taxes are always higher than federal taxes, although decreases in ￿s
and ￿￿ reduce the extent to which the former exceed the latter. To be clear, we do not consider taxes on goods regions are
less e¢ cient at producing but which are a⁄ected by changes in ￿s and ￿￿.
17We summarize these changes in Table 4.
31In the sector of regional comparative advantage, greater output generates increased pollution, which,
at least without harmonization of central policy, results in taxes that are higher in the sector of the
regional comparative advantage good when spillovers across regional boundaries and productivity gaps
between sectors are symmetric. However, as spillovers of pollution decrease in the comparative advantage
industry, the gap between the taxes on the two sectors decreases, and can potentially become negative.
On the other hand, as the productivity gap in the production of the two goods increases (implying a
larger comparative advantage), the gap between the taxes increases. Across regions, increased taxes in the
comparative advantage industry results in lower local production and pollution but higher production and
pollution in the other region.
As a result, independently of the degree of spillovers, we show that federalism results in weaker policy
(lower taxes) than centralism on the good for which a region does not have a comparative advantage (that
is, for the good that is less e¢ ciently produced in a region). For the production of the more e¢ cient
good, federalism can lead to taxes that are higher or lower than centralized taxes, depending on the degree
of inter-regional spillovers of pollution and the productivity gap between sectors. Despite the fact that
centralism always leads to stronger policy in one of the goods, total environmental damages in a country
can still be lower under federalism, particularly when spillovers are low or the productivity gap is large. In
these cases, the environmental externality e⁄ect from pollution spillovers is dominated by a cross-regional
competition e⁄ect. The centralized government lowers taxes on e¢ cient good production to encourage
inter-regional trade and increase the welfare of consumers (and to a lesser extent, producers). As this
occurs, weaker centralized policy in the more e¢ cient sector can possibly o⁄set the stronger policy set in
the less e¢ cient sector and results in higher centralized damages.
Previous literature has suggested that lobbying and ￿rm location competition under federalism can
lead to a ￿race to the bottom,￿where regions push down environmental taxes (or weaken environmental
standards) in an attempt to improve their position relative to other regions. Here, we have identi￿ed
other e⁄ects which tends to weaken centralized policy, through the channels of multiple polluting goods
and regional comparative advantage. If the gap between productivities in regional industries is large (and
spillovers are not too high), federalism can actually lead to stronger (overall) environmental policy and
lower environmental damages than centralism.
324 Appendix
4.1 Inter-regional Environmental E⁄ect: Changes in s and ￿
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In terms of the e⁄ect of a change in s, M1 > 0 and represents the increase in the own pollution e⁄ect
that provides the central government with an incentive to set lower taxes while M2 < 0 and captures
the increase in the spillover e⁄ect that provides the central government with an incentive to set higher
taxes. Overall, however, the latter change dominates and an increase in s thus induces the central gov-
ernment to opt for higher taxes than those set regionally in both sectors. For the sector in which a




































2 < 0; for the other sector (e.g., sector ￿i for region j), that M1+M2 < 0








































In terms of the e⁄ect of a change in ￿, if the own pollution e⁄ect dominates, N2 > 0; furthermore,
assuming that sector i is the one in which region ￿j does not have a comparative advantage, we know, from












2 > 0. We then have that an increase
in ￿
￿j
i strengthens the central government￿ s incentive to reduce the environmental tax on the good in
which a region has a comparative advantage (e.g., good i in region j). However, when we consider the
inter-regional environmental e⁄ect in sector ￿i, that is, the sector in which region ￿j has a comparative




















2 < 0. We then have that an increase in ￿
j
￿i strengthens the central government￿ s incentive
to increase the environmental tax on the good in which a region does not have a comparative advantage
(e.g., good ￿i in region j).
334.2 Proposition 1: E⁄ects of s and ￿ on Centrally Set Taxes































































































































both of which are positive; hence, the greater the spillover e⁄ects of production, the more heavily production
is taxed. Similarly, by partially di⁄erentiating (18) and (19) with respect to ￿
￿j










1 ￿ 6si + s2
i
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3 ￿ 2si + s2
i
￿￿




















which is always positive; hence, as the productivity gap between the two regions narrows, the tax in the
less e¢ cient region always increases while the tax in the more e¢ cient region increases provided that
si > 0:1716.
4.3 Harmonized versus Unharmonized Taxes
We can write di⁄erences between the unharmonized taxes given in (18) and (19) and the harmonized taxes








































































￿3 ￿ 2si ￿ s2
i + ￿
￿j































34for i = a;b and j = A;B with j = A (￿j = B) when i = a and j = B (￿j = A) when i = b. Under
harmonization, the less e¢ cient region subsidizes the more e¢ cient region; however, upon inspection of
the two di⁄erences, we ￿nd that the tax increase in the less e¢ cient region exceeds the tax decrease in the
more e¢ cient region unless pollution is a pure public bad. We can in fact write the di⁄erence between the



























































which is always negative provided that si < 1 and zero if si = 1, that is, pollution is perfectly transboundary.

















3 + si + s2
i + ￿
￿j















































































































￿i which says that the additional pollution harmonization contributes to in the comparative
advantage sector outweights the lower pollution it yields in the less e¢ cient sector and environmental





















we have that, the more transboundary pollution in sector i is, the less (more) environmentally friendly
unharmonized policy is for the region which has (does not have) a comparative advantage in sector i. If




￿i, it is then possible for region j to be better o⁄, from an environmental standpoint,
under harmonization.






































































































































> 0. The larger ￿
￿j
i is, the smaller the direct e⁄ects












































the pollution gap tends to increase (decrease) in region j (region ￿j) at high values of ￿
￿j
i and, the more
transboundary pollution in sector i is (that is, the higher si is), the lower (higher) the values of ￿
￿j
i that
are required for the pollution gap to increase (decrease) in region j (region ￿j).
4.4 E⁄ects of s and ￿ on Locally Set Taxes













































































￿4 = ￿414 + 238si ￿ 108s2
i;



















￿5 = ￿324 + 216si;
36and e ni is given in (32). Noting that ￿k (for k = 1;:::;4) and ￿k (for k = 1;:::;5) are increasing functions


















































































@si are positive over the entire range of feasible values of si.
When we partially di⁄erentiate (30) and (31) with respect to ￿
￿j




























































































Using the above results and the fact that cross-sectoral e⁄ects are absent (that is, pollution spillovers






































































4.5 Comparing Environmental Damages





i (￿;s) ￿ t
j
i ￿ e t
j
i = 0 (namely, b s and b b s), we obtain the partial derivatives of ￿j (￿;s) and T
j
i (￿;s) with




































































where Gl (s) ￿ 0, Gl
k (s) > 0, Bl
k (s) > 0, and Al








￿2s3 + 5s2 + 22s ￿ 85
￿




s4 + 2s2 ￿ 4s + 7
￿
￿ + 2s2 + 8 > 0:
As ￿ 2 (0;1],
Xk1
k=0 Bl






































































38To show that b s < b b s, we totally di⁄erentiate the damage function of region j and obtain




















































































￿i = x, and setting dt
j
i = 0, the



















2 + ￿(1 ￿ s)
2
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2(4 + s2) +
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s2 ￿ 2s + 3
￿
￿
2(4 + s2) +
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(1 + s2)




Upon substitution for x￿ and x, we then get










+ 2s[2(3 ￿ ￿) ￿ s(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ 2
2(4 + s2) +
h
(1 + s2)







which is negative for s = b b s, that is, for values of s such that T
j
i (￿;s) = 0; as
@￿j(￿;s)
@s < 0, we thus have
that b s < b b s.
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